By Morgan Deane
American Public University
With the rise of ISIS and dangerous transnational actors insurgency and counter insurgency remain a hot topic in contemporary discourse. The writings of Mao Zedong are very popular as he is traditionally believed to have first enunciated a clear set of principles regarding guerrilla warfare. Combined with his eventual victory in the Chinese Civil War, Mao’s genius is widely hailed across the globe. But Zhu De, the eventual commander and chief of the Red Army said that “theory without practice is groping in the dark.”
My study reassess Mao’s leadership based a small unit leader in Southern China from 1927-1934. This period is often overlooked in favor of the Long March or Communist guerrilla activities during World War II.
During this Jiangxi period, Mao was far more fortunate than skilled as a pedestrian military leader groping towards solid theory. Much of the credit for his later writings and military maxims should go towards Zhu De.
Mao’s ideas arose in a cultural milieu from 19th century Qing dynasty theorists to those from the early 20th that stressed the need to use difficult terrain to exhaust enemies before massing for a decisive strike. Mao had the good fortune of finding terrain in Jiangxi province that traditionally housed bandits and anti-government forces. Moreover, the Nationalist advantages were negated in the region as they often had to deal with a multiplicity of threats, such as an aggressive Japan in Northern China.
Just as Mao is overestimated because of his eventual victory, the Nationalists are underestimated because of their eventual defeat. Thus their adaptions and stunning victories are overlooked in favor of a more simplistic narrative based on the eventual victory of the Communists.
Mao had the good fortune of being out of power during the Nationalist victory that led to the Long March. Mao was able to regain power later in the 30’s. By then he could advocate what he would have done instead.
Historians have not adequately assessed this Monday morning quarterbacking, but simply read his later writings as another way that Mao was a gifted military leader.
About the Author
Morgan Deane has a B.A. from Southern Virginia University and an M.A. in History from Norwich University. He has presented or published papers on Napoleonic warfare, East Asian history, warfare in the Book of Mormon, and the American Civil War. In 2009, he separated from the military after serving nine years as an infantry riflemen, squad leader and intelligence analyst. His publications include, “Forming the Formless: Sun-Tzu and the military logic of Ender Wiggins,” and numerous articles for the Encyclopedias of Military Philosophy and Russia at War. His book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon is currently in book stores. He is also starting an MPhil/PhD program in War Studies at Kings College London and his research will examine the early insurgency of Mao Zedong.