By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor to In Homeland Security
So, Russian President Vladimir Putin is not dead. Apparently he is in good health, or so he projects. After being absent for 11 days, he returned to nationalistic celebrations. During his absence—many were calling it a disappearance—official photos were seen as older fakes, prompting many Russian experts and analysts to assume he might be sick or that there was some conflict in the upper echelons of the Russian power matrix.
To dispel any doubt in his leadership and abilities, President Putin returned from his unusual public withdrawal to the sounds of Russian pop stars, the national anthem and the celebration of the annexation of Crimea that reportedly drew a crowd of more than 100,000.
Meanwhile, ostentatious fireworks were also seen in the military ranks. Russian war games with the Northern Fleet offered a forceful show of strength; more provocative military flightpaths and aerial incursions. The most troubling of all were the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles to both Crimea and Kaliningrad.
Three strong suits make opposing Putin difficult: nuclear arsenal, large modern military and proximity to Russian Diasporas. Strong economic sanctions have had a massive effect on crippling the Russian economy but such is being resisted by the Kremlin in pure attrition and determination.
Putin is courting the globally condemned Kim Jong Un. Their relationship and trade have increased and just recently Putin invited Kim to the Kremlin. The obvious meaning is simple: ‘If the world hates you, maybe we can learn to love you.’
Russian energy and military deals with Iran are also a part of this game. Russia can do what it wants, when it wants and with whom it wants. It can even ignore or skirt international sanctions during the nuclear talks: ‘No one can stop me,’ is the Putin cry.
International arms and energy sales are the major sources of Russian revenue. Since North Korea already has nuclear weapons, the concern will be weather Russia will sell North Korea more advanced weapons, like it is doing in Iran, Syria, the rebels in Ukraine and other states. Putin has set Russia into a position that can sell sophisticated equipment to regimes that can destabilize Western strategic lines of control and militarily cause geopolitical imbalances at will.
The White House efforts to renew ties with Cuba may have unexpectedly defused possible attempts of Russia to do the same with courting Raul Castro. This is yet to be seen; however, Venezuela still serves as another de facto outpost. Kaliningrad is another headache of rearmament, although it is part of Russia. The larger picture is Russia’s intention of forming an allegiance of isolated or illicit regimes breaking with international law and partnering with whoever will have them.
The cult of a nuclear Putin makes him the scariest man alive. Weather true or untrue, Putin admitted that he was ready to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine “if necessary,” according to The Independent. His nuclear weapons are the only thing that has prevented a military conflict between Russia and the West.
In many ways, Putin is still pushing the boundaries of provocation because this is the only thing that he believes will allow him the advantage he needs in order to pursue a wider policy of his Near Abroad. The Near Abroad is the reunification of ethnic-Russians in places like Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere. Putin is virtually annexing Abkhazia and South Ossetia through a treaty with Georgia.
The Russian Near Abroad has to do with blood and strategic matters, but it is not seen as expansionist; rather, for Putin and many Russians, it is seen as deserved—something that they lost that they are entitled to and that they must retrieve. Further, many believe their actions are seen as harsh and defensive from Western imperialism, reinforced propaganda and mirror imaging. After all, it is NATO in their mind, which is to blame for robbing Russia of its satellite states and the EU for integrating them politically. In this line of reasoning, Crimea becomes a concession prize. It is nowhere in their thinking that Eastern European states actually wanted to depart from Russia of their own free will. And even if that was the case, it is not good for Russia and it is too late for Putin to stop the implementation of the Near Abroad. The present course offers a highly likely scenario that will see the direct takeover of certain former Soviet satellite states in the near future.
To further support this, President Putin has proven that he is not all about hard power options or paramilitary subversion. The leader really has many other coercive and intimidation tactics at his disposal. Putin may still have dreams of his Eurasian Economic Union rivaling the EU. He has called for a regional currency union in Belarus and Kazakhstan to consolidate political controls over those states. It should be viewed as another invasion of sovereignty, as in the 1990s. Putin is preying on their economic hand-to-mouth vulnerabilities and their present dependencies on Russia.
“We ourselves will continue moving forward,” President Putin told the crowds at the Crimea annexation celebration last Wednesday.
Note: The opinions and comments stated in the preceding article, and views expressed by any contributor to In Homeland Security, do not represent the views of American Military University, American Public University System, its management or employees.
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